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Abstract
Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce
an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the
need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing
of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while
taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as
a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the ratio of the variance of the ground load to the total number of
EVs in the grid. In particular, it is shown that any achieved Nash equilibrium substantially improves the load balance across
the grid. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective
behavior of the EV owners using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new
insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.
Key words: Smart grids; electric vehicles; load balancing; selfish routing; Nash equilibrium; price of anarchy; prospect theory.
1 Introduction
Electric vehicles (EVs) are rapidly becoming a ma-
jor component of cities around the world. Based on
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, EVs are expected to
represent 35 percent of new car sales globally by 2040.
Greentech Media Research expects at least 11.4 million
electric vehicles (EVs) on the road only in the U.S. in
2025. Due to this rapid proliferation of EVs, an im-
portant challenge is to effectively manage and control
their integration within the electric power grid [30].
For instance, if too many EVs simultaneously charge
their batteries at a charging station, it will substan-
tially increase the load at that station, which, in turn,
will be detrimental to other grid components. However,
intelligently routing EVs can turn this challenge into
an opportunity by viewing EVs as mobile storage de-
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vices which charge/discharge their batteries at charging
stations that have extra/shortage of energy to offer for
sale. This, in turn, requires introducing an appropriate
mechanism design which aligns EVs’ needs with the
needs of the power grid.
As more EVs join the grid, the waiting time in actual
road traffic and at charging stations will constitute a
major problem. Since EVs need to be charged more of-
ten than fossil-fueled vehicles [19], if there does not exist
enough charging stations, we may expect long queues at
the charging stations that can directly impact the com-
fort of EV owners. One way of handling this issue from
the system level is to build additional charging stations
so as to match the supply and demands. However, this
is not the most cost-effective solution, and yet, it does
not eliminate the necessity of dynamic load balancing at
charging stations (e.g., due to dynamic shift of demands
over time). An alternative solution to this issue is to take
advantage of the distributed nature of the power grid
to dynamically match supply and demands, and this is
the approach that we consider in this paper. In partic-
ular, we provide a systematic scheduling of EVs which
not only takes into account the distribution of the elec-
tricity load but also reduces the traffic congestion and
waiting time at charging stations.
1.1 Related Work
There have been several recent works that investigated
the challenges of managing EVs in the smart grid. In [43],
the authors propose a vehicle-to-aggregator interaction
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game and develop a pricing policy and design a mech-
anism to achieve optimal frequency regulation perfor-
mance. The works in [31] and [14] propose truthful online
auction mechanisms in which agents represent EV own-
ers who bid for energy units and also time slots in which
an EV is available for charging/discharging. Similarly,
the work in [39] considers a consensus based online mech-
anism design for EV charging with pre-commitment.
A real-time traffic routing system based on an incentive
compatible mechanism design has been considered in [9].
In this system a passenger first reports his maximum ac-
cepted travel time, and the mechanism then assigns a
path that matches the passenger’s preference given the
current traffic conditions. In [17] and [23], the authors
propose a congestion game model to control the power
demand at peak hours, by using dynamic pricing. A sim-
ilar approach based on congestion games is proposed in
[6] for EV charging. A survey on utilizing artificial intel-
ligence techniques to manage EVs over the power grid
can be found in [30]. In [2] the authors consider a coupled
power and transportation network and provide an op-
timal pricing scheme to manage EVs over the network.
However, unlike our game-theoretic framework, the ap-
proach in [2] is based on an individual optimization over
an extended network. While the earlier literature pro-
vides important analytic results for managing EVs in the
grid, these works mainly focus on one aspect of smart
grid, (e.g., reducing the peak hour demand) without tak-
ing into account other important factors such as traffic
congestion or waiting time at charging stations which
are also crucial in affecting EVs’ decisions.
Meanwhile, there is a rich literature on routing games
where the traffic congestion is selfishly controlled by ve-
hicle owners who seek to minimize their travel costs
[33,22,36,3,40]. Depending on whether the traffic flow
can be divided among different paths one can distinguish
unsplitable and splitable routing games [3]. Moreover,
whether each user’s contribution to the overall traffic
is negligible or not one can distinguish non-atomic and
atomic routing games [33]. In this regard, one of the
widely used metrics in the literature which measures ef-
ficiency and the extent to which a system degrades due
to selfish behavior of its agents is the price of anarchy
(PoA) [22]. It has been shown in [36] that, for a linear
latency function, the PoA of a nonatomic routing game
is exactly 43 . This result has been extended later in [3] to
splittable routing game with a slightly different bound
on the PoA. Similarly, the authors in [40] have studied
the PoA of selfish load balancing in atomic congestion
games. Moreover, the PoA of noncooperative demand-
response in smart grids with flexible loads/EVs has been
studied in [11] and [10]. Recently, in [34,35,24], a so-
called “smoothness” condition has been developed un-
der which one can obtain simple bounds on the PoA for
a large class of congestion games. However, smoothness
requires decoupling in arguments of the social cost func-
tion which is not immediately applicable to our model.
Moreover, there is strong evidence [18] that real-world,
human decision makers do not make decisions based on
expected values of outcomes, but rather based on their
perception on the potential value of losses and gains as-
sociated with an outcome. Since EVs are owned and op-
erated by humans, the subjective perceptions and deci-
sions of these human owners can substantially affect the
grid outcomes. This makes prospect theory (PT) [18] a
powerful framework that allows modeling real-life hu-
man choices, a natural choice for modeling EVs’ decision
making in smart grids under real behavioral consider-
ations. Applications of PT for energy management by
modifying consumers electricity demands have been ad-
dressed earlier in [37] and [42]. However, these works do
not capture the real-life decision making processes in-
volved in the management of EVs in the smart grid. For
other relevant alternative approachs (other than PT) to
study risk, uncertainty, and behavioral decisions, we re-
fer to [24] and [27].
1.2 Contributions and Organization
To address the aforementioned challenges, the main con-
tribution of this paper is to develop a comprehensive
framework for EV management in smart grids which
takes into account the traffic congestion costs, the elec-
tricity price and availability, the distributed nature of
the system, and the subjective perceptions of the EV
owners. Our work differs from prior art in several as-
pects: 1) It models the interactions between EV using
a routing game [33], by taking into account the traf-
fic congestion costs, 2) Factors in the waiting time of
EVs at charging stations, 3) Introduces an energy pric-
ing scheme to balance the EV load across the grid, and
4) Incorporates real-life decision behavior of EVs under
uncertain energy availability by using PT and studies
its deviations from conventional classical game theory
(CGT). Our work is motivated by the fact that EVs can
be viewed as dynamic storage devices which can move
around the grid and balance the load across it. This man-
dates careful grid designs (e.g., pricing electricity prop-
erly at charging stations) that can align the energy needs
of selfish EVs with those of the smart grid.
In the studied model, we consider a set of EVs that are
traveling from an origin to a destination. Each EV may
or may not stop at one of the charging stations along its
origin-destination path to charge/discharge its battery.
Moreover, once joining a station, an EV can decide on
the amount of energy to charge/discharge at that sta-
tion. Here, the energy price charged at each station for
buying or selling depends on the total energy demand at
that station, a station-specific pricing function, as well
as the ground load which is induced by other grid compo-
nents such as residential or industrial users. Therefore,
each EV makes a decision by choosing a route, a charg-
ing station along that route to join, and the amount of
energy to charge/discharge. We formulate the interac-
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tions between EVs as a repeated noncooperative game
in which each EV seeks to minimize the tradeoff between
travel time and energy price. We show that such a game
admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and we
show that the PoA of this NE is upper bounded by the
ratio of the variance of the ground load to the total num-
ber of EVs in the grid. Hence, for a large number of EVs,
although each EV selfishly and independently minimizes
its own cost, the social cost of all EVs will still be close
to its optimal value, i.e., when a central grid authority
optimally manages all the EVs. Furthermore, we show
that any NE achieved as a result of the EVs’ interactions
will indeed improve the load balancing across the grid.
We then take into account the uncertainty of the ground
load and provide a bound on the number of EVs which
guarantees a low PoA with high probability. In partic-
ular, we extend our model by incorporating the subjec-
tive behavior of EVs and study its deviations from CGT.
Our simulation results provide new insights on energy
pricing at different stations in order to keep the overall
performance of the grid, which is measured in terms of
the social cost, close to its optimal under more realistic
scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce our system model. In Section 3, we estab-
lish existence of pure NE points. We analyze efficiency of
NE points in terms of social cost and load balancement
in Section 4. We extend our results to a stochastic set-
ting with PT in Section 5. Simulation results are given
in Section 6, and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a traffic network modeled as a directed graph
G = (V, E), where each edge e ∈ E represents a road.
This network has a total of n EVs (players) in the set
N . We let ne ∈ Z≥0 be the total number of EVs on
road e. We denote the level of battery charge of vehicle
i by bi ∈ [bi, b¯i], where bi and b¯i denote, respectively,
the minimum level of battery charge for EV i to oper-
ate, and the maximum capacity of EV i’s battery (note
that 0 < bi < b¯i). In this network, we have a total of
m charging stations in the set M that are located over
possibly different roads of the network. Each charging
station j ∈M can serve its EVs with a rate of σj > 0. 1
We denote the set of all EVs associated to station j
by Qj . We assume that each station j measures its ex-
cess/shortage energy with respect to an internal nominal
reference point. However, due to malfunctioning of the
operating grid, stochasticity of the generated solar/wind
energy at station j, or other uncertain loads which are
induced by nearby components, we denote the differ-
ence between the current energy level at station j and
its nominal reference point by gj ∈ R. Therefore, gj > 0
means that station j is willing to offer its excess energy
1 σj is the number of served EVs per time unit at station j.
Fig. 1. Illustrative example of the studied model. Each EV
wants to move from its origin si to its destination ti. The
traffic load on each road is captured by the thickness of that
edge (the thicker an edge, the more traffic on that road).
The blue bar next to each station shows that the station has
extra energy to offer while the red bar shows that the station
is operating below its nominal value. Given the current state
of the network, it seems most reasonable for EV i to choose
the route Pi and stop by station qi to charge li energy units.
for sale while gj < 0 means that station j demands for
extra energy. Note that ideally station j wants to have
gj = 0 in order to keep its current energy level equal to
its nominal value.
We assume that each EV wants to go from its current lo-
cation si ∈ V to its destination ti ∈ V over a path (route)
Pi. During this route, it can choose to charge/discharge
its battery by some amount li ∈ [bi− bi, b¯i− bi], at some
intermediate station qi ∈ M along that route. 2 Here,
li > 0 means that EV i charges its battery by li units
of energy, while li < 0 means it discharges its battery.
Therefore, we can denote the action of an EV (player)
i by ai := (Pi, qi, li), where Pi is the path chosen by
player i from its source to its destination, qi is the se-
lected charging station along Pi, and li is the amount of
electricity that player i decides to charge or discharge
at station qi (Figure 1). Finally, denoting the players’
actions by (ai,a−i), we can define the cost of EV i as:
Ci(ai,a−i) =
∑
e∈Pi
ce(ne) +
|Qqi |
σqi
+ ln
( b¯i
bi + li
)
+
(
fqi(−gqi +
∑
j∈Qqi
lj)− fqi(−gqi+
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}
lj)
)
,
(1)
where ce(·) is a latency function that captures the traffic
congestion as a function of the total number of EVs over
road e ∈ E , and fqi(·) is the energy pricing function at
station qi which is determined by the power grid. In (1),
the first term captures the waiting cost of EV i due to
traffic congestion, the second term is the waiting cost for
joining station qi which is proportional to the number
of vehicles at station qi, and the third term is the risk of
having an empty battery which grows quickly as the bat-
2 See Remark 1 for the case when an EV decides not to join
any station.
3
tery level decreases. 3 Finally, the last term in (1) is the
energy expense/income for choosing to charge/discharge
li units of electricity at station qi. In this formulation,
the energy price for EV i equals to its marginal energy
contribution to station qi. Note that the last term in (1)
can also be negative, which means that EV i can be paid
by the system depending on the aggregate load of EVs
and ground energy in station qi. This incentivizes EVs
who have extra energy in their batteries to join station
qi and discharge their batteries thus balancing the load
at that station.
As it can be seen from the definition of EVs’ cost func-
tions (1), the incurred cost by an EV depends not only
on its own action, but also on the other EVs’ decisions.
This naturally defines a noncooperative game among
the EVs having the following key components: A set N
of EVs (players). Each player i ∈ N has an action set
Ai := Pi×Si× [bi− bi, b¯i− bi], where Pi is the set of all
paths between si to ti, and Si is the set of all stations
along the chosen path by player i. Each player i ∈ N
takes an action ai ∈ Ai and incurs a cost Ci(ai,a−i)
given by (1). In this game, each EV in the grid seeks to
select an action which minimizes its own cost.
Remark 1 The cost function given in (1) is fairly
general in a sense that it can incorporate additional
constraints into the model. For instance, a situation in
which some EVs prefer not to join any station (e.g. due
to charging at home or workplace) can be handled by
adding to each road e ∈ E a virtual station j (i.e., a sta-
tion which physically does not exist, and it is only for
the sake of analysis). We let all the virtual stations have
infinite speed σj =∞ and zero pricing function fj = 0.
As a result, each EV i has the option of joining an actual
station, in which case everything remains as before, or
it will join a virtual station which translates to saying
that EV i will not to join any actual station. Therefore,
all the results in this paper will continue to hold for this
new setting except that we now have m+ |E| stations.
Remark 2 The rationale behind using marginal pricing
is that when the load in a station is high (e.g., due to EV
congestion in that station), marginal pricing becomes
more effective and sets a higher price in that station. This
disincentivizes more EVs to join that station. It is worth
noting that the use of marginal pricing is not specific
to our work only and has been extensively justified in
economics [14,38], modeling of electric vehicles [14,9], as
well as engineering literature [25,9]. For instance, in [14]
and [9] the authors utilize marginal payement strategy
to design truthful mechanisms for EV charging. Finally,
we note that many pricing policies can be implemented
as a special case of marginal pricing. For instance, a fixed
pricing policy which charges an EV a constant amount of
3 Here, the choice of a logarithmic function is one way of
modeling this risk which is mainly motivated by the log
barrier function frequently used in convex optimization [8].
c per unit of electricity usage can be implemented using
the linear pricing function f(x) = cx.
Example 1 Given a road e ∈ E , let be be the length of
that road. Then, a natural choice for the latency function
is the linear latency function given by ce(x) = aex+ be.
This means that the travel time of a vehicle that chooses
road e depends on the length of that road and linearly
increases in terms of the number of other vehicles on that
road. In particular, we may assume that the electricity
cost of traveling over road e is implicitly captured into
this cost function. Otherwise, if an EV incurs a′ex + b
′
e
amount of electricity cost due to travel on road e with
congestion x, then by defining ce(x) := (ae + λa
′
e)x +
(be+λa
′
e) we can capture both delay and electricity cost
for that EV with λ being the tradeoff rate parameter
between these two quantities.
3 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium
Our first goal is to see whether the EVs’ game will yield
a stable outcome, as captured by the notion of a NE:
Definition 1 An action profile (ai,a−i) is called a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) for the EVs’ interaction
game if Ci(ai,a−i) ≤ Ci(a′i,a−i),∀i ∈ N and a′i ∈ Ai.
Next, we show that the EVs interaction game admits a
pure-strategy NE, meaning that although each EV aims
to minimize its own cost, they collectively will converge
to a stable outcome where every EV is satisfied as long
as others do not deviate.
Theorem 1 The EVs’ game admits a pure-strategy NE.
Proof. We show that the EVs’ game is an exact
potential function, and hence, it admits a pure NE. To
see this, let Φ(·) be a potential function defined by
Φ(ai,a−i) =
∑
e∈E
ne∑
x=1
ce(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ1(ai, a−i)
+
m∑
`=1
|Q`|(|Q`|+ 1)
2σ`︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ2(ai, a−i)
+
m∑
`=1
f`(−g` +
∑
j∈Q`
lj) +
n∑
j=1
ln
(
b¯j
bj + lj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ3(ai, a−i)
.(2)
We will show that for any two actions ai = (Pi, qi, li)
and a′i = (P
′
i , q
′
i, l
′
i), we have Φ(ai,a−i)− Φ(a′i,a−i) =
Ci(ai,a−i) − Ci(a′i,a−i). To show this, first we note
that the traffic congestion cost in Ci(a
′
i,a−i) is equal to∑
e∈P ′
i
∩Pi ce(ne)+
∑
e∈P ′
i
\Pi ce(ne+1). This is because if
EV i changes its path from Pi to P
′
i , then the number of
vehicles ne in all the roads e ∈ Pi∩P ′i remains as before.
However, the number of vehicles in roads e ∈ P ′i \ Pi
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increases by exactly 1 (as now vehicle i has joined these
roads). Similarly, if vehicle i leaves station qi to join
station q′i, its new waiting cost will change from
|Qqi |
σqi
to
|Qq′
i
\{i}|+1
σq′
i
. Following the same argument for the cost
associated with the marginal energy price, we can write
Ci(a
′
i,a−i) =
∑
e∈P ′
i
∩Pi
ce(ne) +
∑
e∈P ′
i
\Pi
ce(ne + 1)
+
|Qq′
i
\ {i}|+ 1
σq′
i
+ ln
( b¯i
bi + l′i
)
+
(
fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+ l′i +
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)− fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)
)
.
By subtracting Ci(a
′
i,a−i) from the cost function
Ci(ai,a−i) given in (1), we obtain
Ci(ai,a−i)− Ci(a′i,a−i)
=
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ce(ne)−
∑
e∈P ′
i
\Pi
ce(ne+1)
+
|Qqi |
σqi
− |Qq
′
i
\ {i}|+ 1
σq′
i
+ ln
(bi + l′i
bi + li
)
+
(
fqi(−gqi +
∑
j∈Qqi
lj)− fqi(−gqi +
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}
lj)
)
−
(
fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+ l′i +
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)− fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)
)
.(3)
Next we consider the change in the potential function
due to an action change of player i. We can write:
φ1(ai,a−i)− φ1(a′i,a−i) =
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ce(ne)−
∑
e∈P ′
i
\Pi
ce(ne+1),
φ2(ai,a−i)− φ2(a′i,a−i) =
|Qqi |
σqi
− |Qq
′
i
\ {i}|+ 1
σq′
i
,
φ3(ai,a−i)− φ3(a′i,a−i) = ln
( b¯i
bi + li
)
− ln
( b¯i
bi + l′i
)
+
(
fqi(−gqi +
∑
j∈Qqi
lj) + fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)
)
−
(
fqi(−gqi+
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}
lj) + fq′
i
(−gq′
i
+ l′i+
∑
j∈Qq′
i
\{i}
lj)
)
.
Summing all the above inequalities and noting that
Φ(ai,a−i)−Φ(a′i,a−i) =
3∑
k=1
[φk(ai,a−i)−φk(a′i,a−i)],
we conclude that Φ(ai,a−i)−Φ(a′i,a−i) is exactly equal
to the same expression given in (3).
Theorem 1 shows that a pure-strategy NE exists despite
the fact that the actions of the players can take both
discrete and continuous quantities or they can be highly
coupled (e.g. choosing what station to join highly de-
pends on what route to choose). Even though this theo-
rem does not characterize uniqueness or efficiency of the
equilibrium points, as we will show in Theorem 2, for a
large number of EVs and specific choices of latency and
pricing functions, all the equilibrium points will be al-
most equally efficient in terms of the social cost. In par-
ticular, we will show that for large number of EVs, the
social cost of any NE is at most a small constant factor
worse than the optimal social cost.
It is worth noting that the result of Theorem 1 is very
strong in a sense that not only it guarantees the existence
of a pure NE, but also it shows that any sequence of uni-
laterally updates by the EVs will eventually converge to
a NE. This allows us to implement the EV game as a re-
peated game between EV owners who will, daily, travel
the distance between their home (origin) to their work
(destination). The information that the EVs require to
compute their optimal strategies (e.g., road congestion
or charging station loads) can be broadcast using a data
platform or directly can be sent to the GPS devices of
the EVs. This allows each EV to have access to the most
updated information of the grid state before taking its
action. As a result, if EV i first takes its action, this up-
date will change the state of the entire grid whose infor-
mation will be immediately available to all others. Now
if a new player takes its action by best responding to the
newly updated state, and this process continuous again
and again, then the grid state will eventually converge
to a NE (whose efficiency in terms of social cost and load
balancing is established in Theorems 2 and 4).
4 Price of Anarchy and Load Balancement
In this section we analyze efficiency of the NE points
in the EVs’ game in terms of price of anarchy (PoA)
and load balancement. We first start by analyzing the
price of anarchy of the EVs’ game which is an important
measure to capture how much the selfish behavior of the
EVs can influence the overall optimality of the grid [22].
Definition 2 For the EVs’ interaction game, the PoA
is defined as the ratio of the maximum social cost for all
Nash equilibria over the minimum (optimal) social cost,
i.e., PoA =
maxa∈NE
∑n
i=1
Ci(a)
mina
∑n
i=1
Ci(a)
.
Here, optimality is measured in terms of EVs’ social cost
assuming that a network authority with complete infor-
mation manages the EVs and seeks to minimize the over-
all social cost. In fact, since EVs are selfish entities whose
actions cannot be centrally controlled, modeling EVs’
interactions as a game that yields a small PoA is very im-
portant. Interestingly, the following theorem shows that
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for linear latency and quadratic energy pricing, the PoA
remains small assuming large number of vehicles in the
grid. It is worth noting that the choice of linear latency is
not specific to our work only, and it has been frequently
used in the game theory literature [33,36]. This is be-
cause despite its simplicity, linear latency function can
still capture two main features of travel costs, namely
lengths of the roads be and traffic congestion costs aex.
On the other hand, quadratic pricing is only one way of
pricing to assure improved load balancement (Theorem
4) while still result in a small PoA. However, to avoid
case dependent analysis, in this section we only develop
our analysis for the case of linear latency and quadratic
pricing functions (with a potential to be generalized in
parts to more general functions). We will complete these
results by providing numerical simulations in Section 6
to illustrated the tradeoff between PoA and load balanc-
ing for other choices of latency/pricing functions.
Theorem 2 For linear latency function ce(x) = aex +
be, and quadratic energy pricing function fj(x) = x
2,
assume that each player incurs at least a unit of cost.
Then, PoA ≤ c + 4.5(∑mj=1 g2jn ), where n is number of
EVs, gj is the ground load at station j, and c is a constant.
Proof. Let {ai = (Pi, qi, li, )}ni=1 denote an arbi-
trary NE, and {a∗i = (P ∗i , q∗i , l∗i , )}ni=1 be the social op-
timal solution. Moreover, let NE :=
∑n
i=1 Ci(ai,a−i)
and OPT :=
∑n
i=1 Ci(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) be the social cost of this
equilibrium and the optimal social cost. By definition of
NE, for all i ∈ [n] we must have,
Ci(ai,a−i) ≤ Ci(a∗i ,a−i)
=
∑
e∈P∗
i
\Pi
ce(ne + 1) +
∑
e∈P∗
i
∩Pi
ce(ne)
+
|Qq∗
i
\ {i}|+ 1
σq∗
i
+ ln
( b¯i
bi + l∗i
)
+ (−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk + l
∗
i )
2−(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk)
2.
Summing all the above inequalities for i ∈ [n] we obtain
NE ≤
n∑
i=1
Ci(a
∗
i ,a−i)
=
n∑
i=1
( ∑
e∈P∗
i
\Pi
ce(ne + 1) +
∑
e∈P∗
i
∩Pi
ce(ne)
)
+
n∑
i=1
|Qq∗
i
\{i}|+1
σq∗
i
+
n∑
i=1
ln
( b¯i
bi + l∗i
)
+
n∑
i=1
[
(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk+l
∗
i )
2−(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk)
2
]
.(4)
Next we upper bound each of the three summands in
(4). To this end, let OPT1 and NE1 denote the traffic
congestion costs in the optimal solution and the NE,
assuming a linear latency function ce(x) = aex+ be, i.e.,
OPT1 :=
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈P∗
i
ce(n
∗
e) =
∑
e∈E
n∗e(aen
∗
e + be),
NE1 :=
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Pi
ce(ne) =
∑
e∈E
ne(aene + be),
where ne and n
∗
e denote the number of vehicles on edge
e ∈ E due to the Nash equilibrium and the optimal solu-
tion. We can bound the first summand in (4) as follows:
n∑
i=1
( ∑
e∈P∗
i
\Pi
ce(ne + 1) +
∑
e∈P∗
i
∩Pi
ce(ne)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈P∗
i
ce(ne + 1)
=
∑
e∈E
aen
∗
ene +
∑
e∈E
n∗e(ae + be)
≤
√∑
e
aen2e
∑
e
ae(n∗e)2 +
∑
e
n∗e(aen
∗
e + be)
≤
√∑
e
(aen2e + be)
∑
e
(ae(n∗e)2 + be)
+
∑
e
n∗e(aen
∗
e + be)
=
√
NE1 ×OPT1 +OPT1. (5)
where the first inequality is obtained by upper bounding
ce(ne) by ce(ne+1) for each e ∈ P ∗i ∩Pi, the first equality
holds by the definition of linear latency function, and the
second inequality is due to Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
and the fact that n∗e(ae + be) ≤ n∗e(aen∗e + be),∀e.
To upper bound the second summand in (4), let us define
OPT2 and NE2 to be the total waiting cost at all the
stations in the NE and the optimal solution, respectively,
OPT2 :=
n∑
i=1
|Q∗q∗
i
|
σq∗
i
, NE2 :=
n∑
i=1
|Qqi |
σqi
.
Following identical argument as above in which roads
e ∈ E are replaced by charging stations j ∈ M, and
the quantities (ne, n
∗
e, ae, be), e ∈ E are replaced by
(|Qj |, |Q∗j |, 1σj , 0), j ∈M, we obtain
n∑
i=1
|Qq∗
i
\ {i}|+ 1
σq∗
i
≤
√
OPT2 ×NE2 +OPT2. (6)
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Finally, to bound the last summand in (4), let us define
OPT3 and NE3 to be the total energy cost induced by
the optimal solution and the NE, respectively, i.e,
OPT3 :=
n∑
i=1
[
(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Q∗
q∗
i
l∗k)
2−(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Q∗
q∗
i
\{i}
l∗k)
2 + ln
( b¯i
bi + l∗i
)]
,
NE3 :=
n∑
i=1
[
(−gqi +
∑
k∈Qqi
lk)
2−(−gqi +
∑
k∈Qqi\{i}
lk)
2+ln
( b¯i
bi + li
)]
.
It is shown in Lemma 1 that,
n∑
i=1
[
(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk+l
∗
i )
2−(−gq∗
i
+
∑
k∈Qq∗
i
\{i}
lk)
2+ln
( b¯i
bi + l∗i
)]
≤
√
(γ +NE3) (γ +OPT3) +OPT3
+δ(
√
γ +NE3 +
√
γ +OPT3) + δ
2 + 4nb2max,
where bmax :=maxi b¯i, δ
2 :=
∑m
j=1
g2j
2 , and γ :=δ
2+nb2max.
Substituting this relation together with (5) and (6) into
(4), we get
NE ≤ √OPT1 ×NE1 +
√
OPT2 ×NE2
+
√
(γ +NE3) (γ +OPT3) + (OPT1 +OPT2 +OPT3)
+ δ(
√
γ +NE3 +
√
γ +OPT3) + δ
2 + 4nb2max
≤
√
(γ +OPT1 +OPT2 +OPT3)(γ +NE1 +NE2 +NE3)
+OPT + δ(
√
γ +NE3 +
√
γ +OPT3) + δ
2 + 4nb2max
=
√
(γ +OPT )(γ +NE) +OPT
+ δ(
√
γ +NE3 +
√
γ +OPT3) + δ
2 + 4nb2max
≤
√
(γ +OPT )(γ +NE) +OPT
+ δ(
√
γ +NE +
√
γ +OPT ) + δ2 + 4nb2max, (7)
where the first inequality holds because for any four
positive numbers a1, a2, a3 and a4 we have
√
a1a2 +√
a3a4 ≤
√
(a1 + a3)(a2 + a4). Moreover, the last in-
equality stems from the fact that NE3 ≤ NE, and
OPT3 ≤ OPT . Dividing both sides of (7) by OPT (note
that by the assumptionOPT ≥ n) and setting x = NEOPT ,
x ≤
√
(
γ
n
+ 1)(
γ
n
+ x) + (1 +
δ2
n
+ 4b2max)
+
δ√
n
(
√
γ
n
+ x+
√
γ
n
+ 1), (8)
This in view of Lemma 2 shows that x ≤ c+4.5(∑mj=1 g2jn )
where c := 3 + 12b2max is a constant.
Typically, in real grids one can assume that each player
incurs a unit cost in the system (for example we charge
each EV $1 as a toll of using roads or other grid facili-
ties). Then, as a result of Theorem 2, if there are many
EVs in the grid (i.e., n is large), although every EV min-
imizes its own cost, the entire grid will still operate close
to its social optimal state and within only a small con-
stant factor c. This allows us to align the selfish EVs’
needs with those of the grid and achieve nearly the same
optimal social cost when a central grid authority dic-
tates decisions to EVs. It is worth noting that Theorem
2 does not imply that, for a large number of EVs, the
players’ costs are less (clearly, for higher number of EVs,
the traffic congestion and waiting time at charging sta-
tions is high). However, it shows that, for a large number
of EVs, there is no way to substantially reduce the ag-
gregate cost of all the EVs more than what it is already
achieved at a NE.
Next we consider a similar efficiency metric to the PoA,
namely the price of stability (PoS), which compares the
social cost of the “best” NE over the optimal cost, i.e.,
PoS =
mina∈NE
∑n
i=1
Ci(a)
mina
∑n
i=1
Ci(a)
. In this case one can obtain a
tighter bound for the PoS as stated below:
Theorem 3 For the linear latency and quadratic pricing
function, the PoS of the EVs’ interaction game is upper
bounded by PoS ≤ 2(1 + b2max) + 2
(∑
j
g2j
n
)
.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.1.
Finally, we show that any NE achieved by the EVs will
indeed improve the load balance in the grid. For this
purpose, let us first consider the following definition:
Definition 3 Let bmin = mini bi. We refer to a station j
as a good station if |gj | ≤
√
5
2bmin
. Otherwise, we refer to it
as a bad station. We denote the set of bad stations by B.
Based on this definition, the load imbalance of a good
station is very small and close to 0 which eliminates the
necessity of load balancing in that station. Consider the
initial load imbalance of the grid determined by the vari-
ance of the initial ground loads at all the bad stations
V0 :=
∑
j∈B g
2
j . Now if we let g
NE
j be the aggregate load
induced by a NE at station j, we can express the im-
provement of load balancing at that NE by V0 − VNE ,
where VNE :=
∑
j∈B(g
NE
j )
2 denotes the load variance of
the bad stations at that achieved NE. The following the-
orem shows that every achieved NE improves the load
balance in all the bad stations without hurting the good
stations.
Theorem 4 Given the quadratic pricing function, let us
assume for simplicity that all EVs have the same initial
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battery level bi = b,∀i. Then, for any NE, all the good sta-
tions will remain good while the bad stations become more
balanced. In particular, VNE < V0 −
∑
j∈B µ
2
j , where
µj=

|Qj |(bmin−b) if gj≤(2|Qj |−1)(bmin−b)− 12bmin ,
|Qj |(bmax−b) if gj≥(2|Qj |−1)(bmax−b)+ 12bmax ,
1
2gj else,
and |Qj | denotes the number of EVs at station j at NE.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary but fixed station j.
Note that for any NE {(Pi, qi, li)}i∈N , the load compo-
nents of all the players who join station j, i.e., {li : i ∈
Qj} must form a NE if the players’ costs are restricted
to only the load portion of their costs. In other words,
for every i ∈ Qj , if we consider |Qj | players with costs
Cˆi(l
′
i, l
′
−i)=(−gj+
∑
j∈Qj
l′j)
2−(−gj+
∑
j∈Qj\{i}
l′j)
2+ln
( b¯i
bi + l′i
)
= (l′i)
2 + 2l′i(
∑
j∈Qj\{i}
l′j − gj) + ln
( bmax
bi + l′i
)
,
then, {li : i ∈ Qj} must be a NE for this restricted
game. 4 Since, for every i, k ∈ Qj we have ∂∂2l′
i
Cˆi =
2 + 1(b+l′
i
)2 , and
∂
∂l′
i
∂l′
k
Cˆi = 2, the restricted game with
cost functions Cˆi(l
′
i, l
′
−i) is a strictly convex game and
admits a unique pure NE [32, Theorem 2], given by
{li : i ∈ Qj}. In addition, since by assumption bi = b,∀i,
all the players have the same cost function. As a re-
sult the restricted game is a symmetric convex game
which means that its unique equilibrium is symmet-
ric [12, Theorem 3]. Thus li = l,∀i ∈ Qj , for some
l ∈ [bmin − b, bmax − b]. As a result, the load costs for all
the players i ∈ Qj at the NE are the same and equal to
Cˆi(l) = (2|Qj | − 1)l2 − 2lgj + ln
(bmax
b+ l
)
. (9)
In particular, the equilibrium load l must be the unique
minimizer of (9) in the feasible range [bmin−b, bmax−b],
which is given by
l=

bmin − b if gj ≤ (2|Qj | − 1)(bmin − b)− 12bmin ,
bmax − b if gj ≥ (2|Qj | − 1)(bmax − b)− 12bmax ,
2gj−Ψ+
√
Ψ2+4|Qj |−2
4|Qj |−2 otherwise,
where Ψ := (2|Qj | − 1)b+ gj .
Next, we compute the equilibrium load reduction in sta-
tion j given by (gNEj )
2 − g2j = (−gj + |Qj |l)2 − g2j for
each of the above three possibilities:
4 Note that this property only holds for a fixed charging
station and not necessarily across different stations.
Case I: If gj ≤ (2|Qj | − 1)(bmin − b)− 12bmin , we have
|Qj |2l2 − 2|Qj |lgj = (|Qj |(bmin − b))2 − 2|Qj |(bmin − b)gj
≤ (−3|Qj |2 + 2|Qj |)(bmin − b)2 + |Qj |(bmin − b)
bmin
≤ (−3|Qj |2 + 2|Qj |)(bmin − b)2 ≤ −|Qj |2(bmin − b)2,
where the first inequality is by the upper bound on gj ,
and the second inequality is because bmin − b ≤ 0.
Case II: If gj ≥ (2|Qj | − 1)(bmax− b) + 12bmax , we have
|Qj |2l2 − 2|Qj |lgj = (|Qj |(bmax − b))2 − 2|Qj |(bmax − b)gj
≤ (−3|Qj |2 + 2|Qj |)(bmax − b)2 − |Qj |(bmax − b)
bmax
≤ (−3|Qj |2 + 2|Qj |)(bmax − b)2 ≤ −|Qj |2(bmax − b)2,
where the first inequality is by the lower bound on gj .
Case III: If gj does not belong to Cases I and II, then
l =
2gj−Ψ+
√
Ψ2+4|Qj |−2
4|Qj |−2 , which is the unique root of the
derivative of (9), and hence it satisfies l = 12|Qj |−1 (gj +
1
2(b+l) ). Therefore, we can write
|Qj |2l2 − 2|Qj |lgj
= (
|Qj |
2|Qj | − 1)
2(gj +
1
2(b+ l)
)2 − 2|Qj |
2|Qj | − 1gj(gj +
1
2(b+ l)
)
= (
|Qj |
2|Qj | − 1)
2
[
− g2j (3− 2|Qj | )−
gj
b+ l
(1− 1|Qj | )+
1
4(b+ l)2
]
.
Now, one can easily see that, if |gj | > 1bmin , then gj ≥ 1b+l
or gj ≤ −1b+l , and the quadratic expression inside of the
above brackets is always less than −g2j . Thus,
|Qj |2l2 − 2|Qj |lgj ≤ −( |Qj |
2|Qj | − 1)
2g2j ≤ −(
gj
2
)2.
On the other hand, if |gj | ≤ 1bmin , then the quadratic
expression inside of the above brackets can be at most
(
2|Qj |−1
|Qj | )
2 1
4b2
min
(3− 2|Qj | )
which implies that:
(gNEj )
2−g2j = |Qj |2l2−2|Qj |lgj
≤ 1
4b2min(3− 2|Qj | )
≤ 1
4b2min
.
Therefore we have (gNEj )
2 ≤ 5
4b2
min
which means that
station j remains to be a good station in the NE.
Finally, using I, II, and III, we have (gNEj )
2 − g2j ≤ −µ2j
for all the bad stations j ∈ B with the µj as given in the
statement of the theorem. Summing this inequality over
all the bad stations we get the desired result.
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As a result of Theorem 4, the players charging/discharging
strategies at a NE always improves the load balance in
the grid. In fact, in practice, such load balancing can be
very effective as shown through simulations in Section 6.
Remark 3 In general, assigning the EVs optimally to
balance the load in a centralized manner is computation-
ally very expensive as it requires solving a mixed nonlin-
ear integer program with objective function
∑n
i=1 Ci(a)
to find the optimal paths, charging stations, and the
charge/discharge energy units. However, Theorems 2
and 4 suggest that for large number of EVs the optimal
assignment can be approximated within a constant fac-
tor by a solution where each EV selfishly minimizes its
own cost. This can be done much more efficiently as now
each EV minimizes its cost over only its own actions.
5 Stochastic Ground Load with Prospect EVs
In this section we consider the EVs’ interaction game un-
der a more realistic grid scenario with uncertain ground
load environment and study the effect of EVs’ behavioral
decisions on the overall performance of the smart grid.
Toward this goal we assume that the induced ground
load at each station gj , j ∈ M, which is due to indus-
trial, residential, or commercial users is a random vari-
able with some unknown distribution Gj . Indeed, in a
smart grid, a good portion of the energy generated and
injected to the grid will stem from renewable resources
such as wind turbines or solar panels. Since the amount
of such renewable energy highly depends on the environ-
ment, such as weather conditions, which is a stochastic
phenomenon, the induced renewable energy also changes
stochastically at various locations [13]. On the other
hand, the energy consumption of residential or industrial
users normally follows certain stochastic patterns during
specific time slots of a day (e.g., more consumption dur-
ing early evening hours and less after midnight). Since
the ground loads at different stations are mainly influ-
enced by the grid components within their vicinity, for
sufficiently distant stations, we may assume that the in-
duced ground loads are stochastically independent. Un-
der this independency assumption, we study the opti-
mality of the EVs’ game under stochastic ground load.
It is worth noting that, in general, the PoA of the EVs
game is a function of its underlying parameters such as
ground loads or number of EVs. Therefore, in presence
of stochastic ground loads the PoA will also be a random
variable. As it was proposed in [20], the grid authority
can use EVs to balance the load on the grid by charging
when demand is low and selling power back to the grid
(discharging) when demand is high. To this end, the
following theorem provides an estimate on the required
number of EVs to be added into the network in order to
keep the grid social cost within a constant factor of its
optimal value (i.e., a low PoA) with high probability.
Theorem 5 Let Gj , j = 1, . . . ,m be stochastically in-
dependent ground loads with support in [−K,K] such
that E[Gj ] = µj, and V ar[Gj ] = σ2j . Then, for at least
n ≥ 4.5∑mj=1(µ2j +σ2j )+4.5K√m ln( 1 ) EVs in the grid,
we have PoA ≤ 4+12b2max, with probability at least 1−.
Proof. Since {Gj , j ∈ M} are independent, so
are their squares {G2j}, and we have E[
∑m
j=1
G2j
m ] =∑m
j=1
(µ2j+σ
2
j )
m . Using Hoeffding bound for independent
and non-identical random variables we have
P
[ m∑
j=1
G2j −
m∑
j=1
(µ2j + σ
2
j ) > mt
]
≤ exp (− 2mt2
K2
)
.
Since PoA ≤ c + 4.5(
∑m
j=1
G2j
n ), where c = 3 + 12b
2
max,
by choosing t =
n
4.5−
∑m
j=1
(µ2j+σ
2
j )
m , we can write
P[PoA ≥ c+ 1] ≤ P
[∑m
j=1G
2
j
n
> 1
]
= P
[∑m
j=1G
2
j
n
>
∑m
j=1(µ
2
j + σ
2
j ) +mt
n
]
≤ exp (− 2mt2
K2
)
. (10)
Now in order the probability in (10) to be less than ,
we need to have t ≥ K
√
ln( 1 )
2m . Finally, replacing the
expression for t in this inequality and solving for n, we
obtain the desired bound.
5.1 Prospect-Theoretic Analysis of the EVs’ Game
In this section, we take into account the subjective be-
havior of EV owners under uncertain energy availability.
In this regard, there is a strong evidence [18] that, in
the real-world, human decision makers do not make de-
cisions based on expected values of outcomes evaluated
by actual probabilities, but rather based on their percep-
tion on the potential value of losses and gains associated
with an outcome. Indeed, using PT, the authors in [18]
showed that human individuals such as EV owners, will
often overestimate low probability outcomes and under-
estimate high probability outcomes. This phenomenon,
known as weighting effect in PT, reflects the fact that
EV owners usually have subjective views on uncertain
outcomes such as energy availabiity at the charging sta-
tions. Moreover, there is an evidence that in reality hu-
mans perceive and frame their losses or gains with re-
spect to a reference point using their own, individual and
subjective value function. As an example, risk averse EV
owners consider any energy price higher than that when
the grid operated in its balanced condition as a loss and
overestimate it. This is a consequence of the so-called
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loss aversion behavior which leads different EVs to select
different reference points and evaluate their gains/losses
according to them. Such reference dependent loss aver-
sion behavior can be explained under the framing ef-
fect in PT which differs from CGT that assumes players
are rational agents who aim to minimize their expected
losses.
In fact, PT has been successfully applied in many prob-
lems with applications both in engineering and eco-
nomics. For instance, the authors in [16] study humans’
behavioral decisions in the presence of failure risk in
a common-pool resource game. It has been shown in
[13] that taking into account the subjective behavior of
prosumers (joint prosumer-consumer) in smart grid can
substantially change the energy management and distri-
bution pattern compared to the conventional expected
utility methods. We refer to [5] and [41] for a compre-
hensive survey and recent results on PT in economics
and other fields. Therefore, to capture such behavioral
decisions, we use the following definition from PT [18]:
Definition 4 Any EV i has a reference point zir and
two corresponding functions wi : [0, 1] → R and
vi(z, z
i
r) : R2 → R, known as weighting and valuation
functions. The expected prospect of a random variable Z
with outcomes z1, z2, . . . , zk, and corresponding proba-
bilities p1, p2, . . . , pk, for electric vehicle i is given by
E
PT
[Z] :=
k∑
`=1
wi(p`)vi(z`, z
i
r).
In general, the value function that passes through the ref-
erence point is S-shaped and asymmetrical. This means
that the value function is steeper for losses than gains
indicating that losses outweight gains. Two of the widely
used weighting and valuation functions in the PT litera-
ture are known as Prelec weighting function and Tversky
valuation function defined by [29,1],
vi(z, z
i
r) =
{
(z − zir)c1 if z ≥ zir,
−c2(zir − z)c3 if z < zir,
wi(p) = exp(−(− ln p)c), (11)
where 0 < c ≤ 1 is a constant denoting the distor-
tion between subjective and objective probability. Here,
c1, c3 ∈ (0, 1) determine the curvature of the value func-
tion in gains and losses, respectively, and capture hu-
mans behaviour as risk averse in gains and risk seeking
in losses justified by behavioral economics [7,1,41]. On
the other hand, loss aversion is typically captured by
the parameter c2 > 1 which reflects the fact that human
usually perceive losses much more than gains and out-
weight them. 5 Moreover, we assume that the reference
5 The behavior under c2 ∈ (0, 1) is often referred to as gain
energy price for EV i is given by
zir := f(
∑
j∈Qqi
lj)− f(
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}
lj), (12)
which is the price that EV i expects to pay in station qi
given that this station operates in its complete balanced
condition (i.e., gqi = 0). In particular, anything above
or below this reference price is considered as loss or gain
for that EV and is measured by value function v(z, zir).
To formulate the EVs’ interaction game using PT, we
assume that the ground load at station j ∈ M follows
a discrete distribution Gj with zero mean and a proba-
bility mass function hj(·). Let Z be the random variable
Z := f(−Gqi+
∑
j∈Qqilj)− f(−Gqi+
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}lj), and
z(θ) be the realization of Z when the ground load at
station qi is θ. Therefore, by Definition 4, the perceived
prospect gain/loss by EV i equals
E
PT
[Z] =
∑
θ
wi(hqi(θ))vi(z(θ), z
i
r). (13)
On the other hand, as it has been shown in [21], that
gains and losses are not all that EVs care about. In other
words, not only the sensation of gain or avoided loss does
affect the payoff function for an EV i, but so does the
actual energy price that EV i pays to satisfy its need.
Therefore, in contrast to prior formulation based on a
value function defined solely over gains and losses, we
take preferences also into the cost functions by assuming
that the overall cost to EV i with reference point zir is
given by
CPTi (ai,a−i)=
∑
e∈Pi
ce(ne)+
|Qqi |
σqi
+ln
( bmax
bi + li
)
+ zir + E
PT
[Z], (14)
where zir and E
PT
[Z] are given by (12) and (13), respec-
tively. Here, each EV i aims to minimize its own prospect
cost given by (14) by choosing an appropriate action ai.
The following theorem shows that despite extra nonlin-
earity of the weighting and reference effects in the play-
ers’ cost functions, the EVs’ game under PT still admits
a pure NE.
Theorem 6 For the quadratic pricing f(x) = x2, the
EVs’ game under PT admits a pure-strategy NE. In par-
ticular, the best response dynamics converge to one of
such NE points.
Proof. For the quadratic pricing function we have
z(θ)− zir = (−θ +
∑
j∈Qqi
lj)
2 − (−θ +
∑
j∈Qqi\{i}
lj)
2 − zir = liθ.
seeking [41].
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Substituting this relation into (14), we obtain
CPTi (ai,a−i) =
∑
e∈Pi
ce(ne) +
|Qqi |
σqi
+ ln
( bmax
bi + li
)
+ zir +
∑
θ
wi(hqi(θ))vˆi(liθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜PT(a)
,
where vˆi(x) = x
c1 if x ≥ 0, and vˆi(x) = −c2|x|c3 , other-
wise. Now consider the function Ψ(·) defined by
Ψ(ai,a−i)=
∑
e∈E
ne∑
x=1
ce(x)+
m∑
`=1
|Q`|(|Q`|+1)
2σ`
+
n∑
i=1
ln
(
bmax
bi + li
)
+
m∑
`=1
(
∑
j∈Q`
lj)
2
+
n∑
i=1
∑
θ
wi(hqi(θ))vˆi(liθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ˜(a)
.
We argue that this function is an exact potential function
for the EVs’ game under PT. In fact, if we did not have
the prospect terms C˜PT(a) and Ψ˜(a) in the structure of
CPTi (a) and Ψ(a), the proof would immediately follow
by the same lines of argument as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1. However, for the quadratic pricing, since the term∑
θ wi(hqi(θ))vˆi(liθ) is a player specific function which
only depends on action of player i and is uncorrelated
from a−i, we easily get C˜PT(ai,a−i)− C˜PT(a′i,a−i) =
Ψ˜PT(ai,a−i) − Ψ˜PT(a′i,a−i). This shows that Ψ(·) is
indeed an exact potential function for the EVs’ game
under PT and quadratic pricing. As a result, any mini-
mizer of Ψ(·) is a pure-strategy NE of the EVs’ game. In
particular, since the action set of players are compact in
their own ambient space, this immediately implies that
the sequence of best responses of EVs will converge to a
pure-strategy NE [26].
Here, we should mention that if we use different pricing
functions or assume other sources of uncertainty such
as randomness in players actions, then the EVs’ game
under PT will not necessarily admit a pure-strategy NE.
In fact, one of the challenges of analyzing the proposed
EV game under PT is the extra nonlinearities in the
players’ cost functions which stem from weighting and
framing effects. This further complicates the analysis of
the PoA under PT. For instance, as opposed to CGT, the
PoA of the game with prospect cost functions will now
depend on the specific choice of weighting functions and
varying reference points. In the next section, we provide
some numerical results to study the PoA of the EVs’
game under both CGT and PT.
Fig. 2. Network structure for the simulations.
6 Simulation Results
For our simulations, we choose the traffic network to
be as in Figure 2 with 5 directed roads, and 3 charging
stations. We assume i.i.d Gaussian distributions Gj ∼
N(0, 10) for the ground load at different stations. Also,
for simplicity, we assume that all the EVs are identical
with bmax = 5, bmin = 0.1, and bi = 3,∀i, who want to
travel from the origin s to the destination t.
6.1 PoA under Classical Game Theory
In Figure 3, we illustrate how the PoA under CGT
changes as more EVs join the grid and compare the
outcomes for different choices of pricing and latency
functions. Here, we let the number of EVs increase from
n = 2 to n = 9, and compute the PoA when the nonlin-
earity of the pricing function increases from f(x) = x2/3
to f(x) = x8/3. Moreover, we consider the effect of
linear latency function ce(x) = 5x + 10 and quadratic
latency function ce(x) = 5x
2 + 10 on the PoA. As it can
bee seen, joining more EVs monotonically reduces the
PoA as was expected by Theorem 2 for the case of lin-
ear latency and quadratic pricing functions. However, it
turns out that the PoA generally increases as the non-
linearities of the pricing and latency functions increase.
In particular, the mismatch between the degree of non-
linearity of the pricing and latency functions degrades
PoA. Hence, to achieve a high grid performance in terms
of social cost, the grid authority should relatively match
the energy price with the latency costs.
Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of load balance im-
provement (i.e., 100V0−VNEV0 %) for the worst achieved
NE corresponding to each of the cases in Figure 3. It
is interesting to see that there is a tradeoff between the
PoA and the load balance. For instance, for the linear
latency function ce(x) = 5x + 10, the pricing function
f(x) = x2/3 (red dashed line in both figures) achieves
the best PoA and the worst load balancing performance.
In fact, for the linear latency function, it can be seen that
the quadratic pricing f(x) = x2 (dashed black curve)
performs very well both in terms of PoA and load bal-
ancing. However, it should be noted that the best perfor-
mance among the above cases is achieved for the pricing
rule f(x) = x4/3 (solid blue curve).
In Table 1 we have listed the worst NE strategies and
social cost, as well as the optimal social cost for n = 9
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vehicles. As an example the NE strategy for player 1 is
to take the route P2 = (e2, e5), join station 3, and charge
its battery by l1 = 0.79 energy units. In this table, the
initial realized random ground loads at stations Q1, Q2,
and Q3 are g1 = 0.937, g2 = −11.223, and g3 = 3.061,
respectively. Therefore, the initial load imbalance equals
V0 = 136.207, while the ground loads at the NE at these
stations are given by gNE1 = −0.123, gNE2 = 5.007, and
gNE3 = 1.229. As a result, the load imbalance at this NE
equals VNE = 26.60 which is substantially lower than the
initial load imbalance V0 = 136.207 (84% improvement).
6.2 PoA under Prospect Theory
Here, we evaluate the effect of PT on the PoA and load
balancing. We set ce(x) = 5x + 10 and f(x) = x
2,
and consider n = 6 EVs over the network of figure 2.
Moreover, we assume that all the EVs have the same
weighting and valuation functions given by (11) with
parameters (c, c1, c2, c3). Figure 5 illustrates the effect
of probability distortion parameter c for fixed values of
(c1, c2, c3) = (0.88, 2.25, 0.88) which are estimated based
on experimental studies on human subjects [7]. As it can
be seen from the top figure, the PoA has a complicated
Table 1
Pure NE for n = 9 EVs, three paths P1 = (e1, e4), P2 =
(e2, e5), P3 = (e2, e3, e4), and three stations Q1, Q2, and Q3.
n P1 P2 P3 Q1 Q2 Q3 li
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.46
2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.46
3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.46
4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.46
5 0 0 1 1 0 0 1.06
6 1 0 0 0 1 0 -1.55
7 1 0 0 0 1 0 -1.55
8 1 0 0 0 1 0 -1.55
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 -1.55
NE 863.53 OPT 821.77
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Fig. 5. PoA (red curve) and the total NE induced load (blue
curve) for different values of the PT probability weighting
function parameters c.
nonlinear relation with the distortion probability param-
eter. One possible reason is that for mid-ranges of the
probability distortion parameter, the system has a large
number of NEs which results in a worse performance in
terms of PoA. However, the induced load in the grid sta-
tions monotonically decreases as EVs become more ra-
tional (i.e., c approaches to 1). In particular, for small
values of c, the EVs start to charge or discharge more
aggressively which will fully imbalance the station loads.
This is because for very low ranges of c, the EVs behave
fully irrational and start to make profit by completely
ignoring their travel costs and joining the profitable sta-
tions to buy/sell energy at a very low/high price.
Finally, in Figure 6 we have illustrated the effect
of different PT parameters (c, c1, c2, c3) estimated
from experimental studies [7] on the PoA and to-
tal NE induced load in the stations. 6 Here, we set
A = (0.75, 0.68, 2.54, 0.74), B = (0.75, 0.81, 1.07, 0.8),
C = (0.75, 0.71, 1.38, 0.72), D = (0.75, 0.86, 1.61, 1.06),
and E = (0.75, 0.88, 2.25, 0.88). In particular, the last
bar corresponds to the selection of (c, c1, c2, c3) =
6 In Figure 6, we have scaled down the total NE induced
load VNE by a factor of 0.01.
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Fig. 6. PoA (blue bar) and total induced load at the worst
NE (yellow bar) for different set of PT parameters estimated
from behavioral studies.
(1, 1, 1, 1) which is for the case of risk neutral EVs. As
it can be seen, for the above set of parameters, the
grid benefits the most (both in terms of PoA and load
balance) when the EVs are risk neutral (as it was the
underlying assumption in modeling the EVs interac-
tion game). The worst-case situations occur for the EV
owners whose subjective valuation lie in group parame-
ters D and E. This suggest that for such type of EVs,
one must modify the pricing rules in order to take into
account the negative effects of EVs behavioral decisions.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the interaction of selfish
electric vehicles in smart grids. We have formulated
a noncooperative game between the EVs and, then,
we have shown that the game admits a pure-strategy
NE. Then, we have shown that the PoA of the game is
bounded above by the “variance” of the ground load
divided by the total number of vehicles. This in turn
implied that for large number of EVs in the grid, the en-
tire system operates very close to its optimal condition
with the minimum social cost, despite the fact that EVs
are selfish identities. In particular, we have obtained a
tighter upper bound for the PoS of the EVs’ game, and
showed that any achieved NE balances the load further
across the grid. We have extended our results to the
case where the ground load is stochastic and incorpo-
rated the subjective behavior of EVs using PT into our
model. Simulation results showed that, under realistic
grid scenarios with subjective EVs, quadratic pricing is
more suitable for large number of EVs, while for fewer
EVs, exponential pricing would be a better choice.
As a future direction of research, one can consider an
online optimization version of our setting in which the
number of EVs is not fixed, and the vehicles sequentially
join the system by best responding to the current state of
the system. In that ragard, the results of [15] seem to be
a good starting point. Finally, studying the EVs’ behav-
ioral decision in the presence of mixed-strategies is very
interesting. In such scenarios uncertainty will stem, not
only from ground loads but also from EVs’ probabilistic
decisions. Therefore, one would expect to observe more
deviations between PT and CGT as it has been shown
in [13] for a different grid setting.
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A Appendix
Lemma 1 Let OPT3 and NE3 be defined as in the proof
of Theorem 2. Then
n∑
i=1
[
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i
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∑
k∈Qq∗
i
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∗
i )
2−(−gq∗
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2+ln
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)]
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√
γ +OPT3) + δ
2 + 4nb2max,
where bmax = maxi b¯i, δ
2 :=
∑m
j=1
g2j
2 , and γ := δ
2+nb2max.
Proof. let L∗j :=
∑
k∈Q∗
j
l∗k be the aggregate load
induced by the optimal solution in station j. We have
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Now since for every i we have l∗i ≤ bmax and ln
(
b¯i
bi+l∗i
) ≥
0, using above relation we obtain,
OPT3 ≥ 2
m∑
j=1
(
L∗j )
2 − 2
√√√√ m∑
j=1
g2j
m∑
j=1
(L∗j )2 − nb2max.
Defining A :=
√∑m
j=1(L
∗
j )
2, we can rewrite the above
inequality as A2−
√∑m
j=1 g
2
jA− 12 (nb2max +OPT3) ≤ 0.
As this quadratic polynomial is nonpositive, its discrim-
inant must be nonnegative. Thus
∆∗ :=
m∑
j=1
g2j + 2(nb
2
max +OPT3) = 2γ +OPT3 ≥ 0,
In particular, solving this quadratic inequality for A, we
obtain A ≤ 12 (
√∑m
j=1 g
2
j +
√
∆∗). Therefore,
√√√√ m∑
j=1
(L∗j )2 ≤
1
2
(
√√√√ m∑
j=1
g2j +
√
∆∗). (A.1)
Using the same procedure for the Nash equilibrium we
have √√√√ m∑
j=1
L2j ≤
1
2
(
√√√√ m∑
j=1
g2j +
√
∆), (A.2)
where Lj :=
∑
k∈Qj lk is the aggregate load induced by
the NE in station j, and ∆ := 2γ +NE3. Now we have
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where the first inequality is by l∗i ≤ bmax,∀i, the second
inequality is by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and the last
inequality is due to (A.1) and (A.2). Finally, by substi-
tuting ∆ = 2γ +NE3 and ∆
∗ = 2γ +OPT3 in the last
expression above, and simplifying the terms, we obtain
the desired bound.
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Lemma 2 Let δ2 :=
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j=1
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2 and γ := δ
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. Then we can rewrite (A.3) as
x − q ≤ p√ γn + x. Squaring both sides and solving for
x we obtain
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n
). (A.4)
As p2 + 4q + 4 γn ≤ (p+ 2qp + 2γpn )2, we can upper bound
(A.4) by x ≤ p2 + 2q+ γn . Replacing the expressions for
p and q into this relation and simplifying we obtain
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Finally, using γn =
δ2
n + b
2
max into (A.5) and noting that
1+ γn ≤ ( δ√n +
b2max
√
n
2δ )
2, we obtain the desired result.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
To bound the PoS, we use the potential function method
as in [28, Theorem 19.13] to show that the social cost
C(a) :=
∑
i Ci(a) has pretty much the same structure as
the potential function Φ(a). To do so, by using the linear
latency function ce(x) = aex + be, and the quadratic
energy pricing fj(x) = x
2,∀j in the potential function
(2), we get
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On the other hand, the social cost equals
C(a) =
∑
e
(
aen
2
e + bene
)
+
m∑
j=1
|Qj |2
σj
−
m∑
j=1
∑
k∈Qj
l2k
+ 2
m∑
j=1
L2j − 2
m∑
j=1
gjLj +
n∑
i=1
ln
( b¯i
bi + li
)
.
(A.7)
Comparing (A.6) and (A.7), we can write
1
2
C(a) ≤ Φ(a) ≤ C(a) +
m∑
j=1
∑
k∈Qj
l2k +
m∑
j=1
g2j .
≤ C(a) + nb2max +
m∑
j=1
g2j .
Now let aˆ be the NE which minimizes the potential func-
tion Φ(·), and a∗ be the optimal action profile. Then,
C(aˆ) ≤ 2Φ(aˆ) ≤ 2Φ(a∗) ≤ 2[C(a∗) + nb2max +
m∑
j=1
g2j ].
Therefore, dividing both sides by C(a∗) ≥ n, we get
PoS ≤ C(aˆ)
C(a∗)
≤ 2
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∑
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j
n
)
.
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